The University of California, Irvine
Paradoxical as it may appear, isn't it through
the rights of man that
transpire today - at a planetary level - the worst discriminations?
Jean Baudrillard, Les mots de passe
With these words Jean Baudrillard suggests that the doctrine of the rights of man, which intends to empower individuals in relation to governments, becomes, in the context of globalization, a discourse that legitimizes the hegemony of the Western nations, especially the United States, in relation to non-Western societies. "The worst discriminations," to use his phrase, are those that enable the West to impose its economic leverage and political will against those nations with less developed industrial structures and weaker systems of military protection. Activists in the human rights movement deploy the doctrine of natural rights to rescue victims primarily in non-Western societies. Certainly Baudrillard does not wish to diminish the importance of their work. Yet he calls attention to the way this same doctrine may also work to undermine the ability of non-Western governments to stem the process of globalization in which, perhaps as a secondary effect, the West imposes its culture upon the rest. Baudrillard sounds a warning: with the increasing integration of economic activity and the increasing exchange of cultural forms and practices, the conventional political wisdom of liberal societies may no longer hold sway.
|The Citizen in/as Question|
In this essay I shall revisit another hallmark of Western political ideology - the concept of the citizen - and ask if this mainstay of democratization also has effects today that limit its anti-authoritarian credentials. The concepts of the citizen and natural rights are closely connected and derive from the same democratizing movements that arose in the eighteenth century. "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen" is a monument from the French Revolution of 1789 that binds natural rights discourse with the idea of citizenship in a partnership that has proven its worth against monarchical tyrannies during the past two centuries, not only in the United States and Europe but in Latin America and other locations. Human rights and citizenship are tied together and reinforce each other in the battle against the ruling classes. If there are asserted rights in simply being human, it is also posited that this is not enough: there must also be something called "citizenship." Human rights, as Jacques Derrida argued in the case of the American "Declaration of Independence" of 1776, (Derrida 1986) come into existence in their enunciation, but also with the practical force of the mobilized population of "commoners." They are assured by their inscription in Constitutions that found governments and they persist in their association with those governments as the ground of political authority.
Human rights also seems excessive: why not just rights of French people or Americans? The claim to the "human" by the French revolutionaries appears entirely unjustified and, indeed, unnecessary. Except for a number of important considerations. First, French rights was a term in practice already occupied. Formally, the rights of France were the King's rights, true enough modified to insure some provenances by certain other groups. French rights could be interpreted in a radical way: to contrast with rights actually possessed by the population at large, or rights asserted as future possibilities by the population at large. This after all was the spirit of Abbé Sieyès' intervention in the revolutionary process when he claimed, in What is the Third Estate?, that the "people," not the King, were the referent of the term "France" or "the nation." (Sieyès 1789) But, second, the sum of particular existing or possible rights of French individuals did not serve the purpose of a revolution, did not constitute enough of a break with the past. It did not clean the slate of all the injuries and inequities that accumulated for the millennial reign of the Old Regime. Something was needed that would wipe away the regulations through which French people were defined as subjects of the monarchy and of the complex network of other authorities that crisscrossed the territory of France (in its various incarnations) during the Old Regime. The problem is that there was no basis in practice to assert and to institute a theory of rights that named any "real" group. One therefore had to leap beyond oneself, to become "human." Only by being human - not French, not Christian, not Burgundian - could rights be grounded. "Human" served as the foundation but as an impossible foundation. The unfortunate fact of 1789 was that the referent to the signifier "human" existed in no more a substantial form (and perhaps even less so) than the term "god." Numerous, tragic exclusions were prescribed in the term "human" in 1789 - as feminists, anti-race theorists, and animal rights theorists have properly insisted. Two centuries later, the referent is returning.
The term citizen was required to be appended to the human in 1789 for all of these reasons. And for at least one more: the citizen was required both to produce in practice human rights and to contain those rights. The practice of the citizen realized human rights which, once installed, filled in the content of citizenship. Karl Marx argued that the duality of the human and the citizen reflected in politics the split between the private and the public, between the bourgeois individual and the person engaged in political affairs. Marx wrote:
Marx goes on to show how private property, the economic relation, structures the political relation, rendering "man" not the "human" but the bourgeois. (Balibar 1994: Chapter 9) Here I stress instead the inherent problem in the term "human rights": that it requires a string of supplements to account for its impossibility and among these in 1789 is the "citizen" as practical realization of the human.
Balibar objects to Marx's understanding of the split between man and the citizen as one between the private person of civil society and the public person of political rights and practices. Instead Balibar argues that "man" refers to the same referents as "citizen," that two are really one. He contends that the conjunctive "and" standing between the two terms in the document signifies an identity, not a difference, an identity in what Balibar calls "equaliberty," a simultaneous proclamation that equality and liberty only exist together. (Balibar, 1994: 46-47) For Balibar, "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen" announces a new, unified anthropology, a demand that the human emerge on the stage of world politics with the rights of the citizen and at the same time. This "reopening of the question of the identity between 'man' and 'citizen'..." has as its purpose "to progress toward a citizenship overdetermined by anthropological difference, explicitly toward its transformation..." (56) Balibar radicalizes the "Declaration" beyond its bourgeois determinations (as Marx saw them) into a general concept of "equaliberty" in the age of globalization. There is, he claims, "universal truth contained in the Declaration of 1789," that betokens "a postmodern epoch in which the question of going beyond the abstract or generic concept of man on the basis of generalized citizenship is posed." (59) He would have the term "citizen" labor greatly to signify democracy in the age of globalization. I wonder if it is up to the task.
In the present context, one must tread lightly and carefully in any critique of the limitations of these bulwarks of human freedom. Yet circumstances today present an extraordinary case of transcultural and transnational mixing. Although human beings long ago migrated all over the planet and have long engaged in travels and exchanges across localities, the density of global transactions today transmutes quantity into quality. A threshold has been passed, perhaps never to be reversed, in which the human species transacts among itself as never before, however unequally and unevenly, the spread of these practices. I argue in this essay that the conditions of globalization and networked media present a new register in which the human is recast and along with it the citizen. I explore the question of the suitability of this term today as a democratizing sign, as a figure for the practice of the human.
|Globalization versus Citizenship|
Critical discourse today locates an antagonism between globalization and citizenship. This position maintains that the deepening of globalizing processes strips the citizen of power. As economic processes become globalized, the nation state loses its ability to protect its population. The citizen loses her ability to elect leaders who effectively pursue her interests. When production facilities are dispersed beyond the nation, jobs are lost to foreigners, labor markets are affected by conditions in countries with highly unequal living standards, and capital flows, at the speed of light, to places of optimum returns, regardless of the disruptions and sufferings thereby enacted. Consumption is also planetary in scope, bringing across borders alien cultural assumptions as embodied in the flows of commodities. The popular need no longer be the local. Although foreign goods are inflected with community values and easily adapted to local conditions, they retain to some extent their quality as indexes of otherness. More dramatically still than production and consumption, nation states are losing their cultural coherence by dint of planetary communications systems. Much of contemporary music is global music or at least a fusion of diverse musical cultures. Satellite technology and the internet bring all media (especially television from the United States) across national boundaries as if those borders did not exist. Global processes run deep and wide, rendering problematic the figure of the citizen as a member of a limited national community.
In this conjuncture the figure of the citizen is placed in a defensive position. If freedom inheres only to the citizen, then we must admit that in all likelihood freedom is lost or soon to be lost. I urge us to consider, against the defensive posture, an offensive one. We need to reconfigure the political individual in relation to conditions of globalization, to discover amidst the troubling inequalities of north and south and the unlimited appetite of corporate greed, a means to define a new form of power and a new means of association, perhaps as Jacques Derrida writes, "a new international," one that is able to open a new horizon of freedom in the space of the Earth. (Derrida 1994)
|Beyond the Citizen|
I want to suggest in this essay, in the spirit of the epigram from Baudrillard, that Western concepts and political principles such as the rights of man and the citizen, however progressive a role they may have played in history, may not provide an adequate basis of critique in our current, increasingly global, condition. They may not provide, that is, a vehicle for thinking through and mobilizing a planetary democratic movement. This is so for three reasons. First, there is the simple fact that these principles derive from the West, and that the West is responsible for an imperialist and capitalist form of globalization, a condition that detracts from the ability of these principles to catalyze truly global movements against domination, and that renders one suspicious of them from the start. Second, the situation today calls for democratic principles that include difference with universality, that cover the peoples of the Earth but acknowledge situational differences. Enlightenment principles are deficient here because they move to the universal too quickly, forgetting their conditions of possibility in an emergent bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century. In the rush to insist on democracy and humanity, in the intoxication with the idea of democracy, and in the irrefutable radicality of such ideas in the context of the waning of the Old Regime in Europe, the principles of natural right required one to extract oneself from the social in order to proclaim the universal as natural. Third, nowadays the natural no longer exists as an autonomous realm of self-determination. Today science and technology, as they are practised through social institutions, constitute a "humanized" nature and in so doing bring forth a population of machines. The conditions of globalization are not only capitalism and imperialism: they include the linking of human and machine. New democratizing principles must take into account the cultural construction of the human/machine interface. In short, we may build new political structures outside the nation state only in collaboration with machines. The new "community" will not be a replica of the agora but it will be mediated by information machines. What is required, therefore, is a doctrine of the rights of the human/machine interface.
|Interlude on Identity|
One vision of a new citizenship joined with difference is offered by Steven Spielberg in his 1997 film, Amistad. Let me explain what I mean by this surprising assertion and indicate why I think Spielberg's is not an adequate vision of new citizenship.
Near the end of the film, John Quincy Adams (played by Anthony Hopkins) pleads before the Supreme Court of the United States for the lives of African mutineers by arguing, against John Calhoun, a Southern advocate of slavery, that men are free by nature. Adams eloquently orates a liberal position, while pointing for emphasis to a copy of the Declaration of Independence that hangs in the chambers. Resistance to slavery, he says, such as that of the accused and that which is inscribed in the document, is proof enough that men are free. Continuing his oration, Adams then switches to another line of argument, one provided him by Cinque (played by Djimon Hounsou), a member of the accused group. Shortly before the trial, Adams and Cinque speak to each other (through an interpreter). Upon learning from Adams that their case will be difficult to win, Cinque announces that he will invoke the tradition of all his ancestors in order to give him strength. The African, faced with an extreme danger, merges his own identity with the identities of his forebears to achieve maximum solidity of self, or even a collective self.
The surprising move in the film is that Adams reproduces Cinque's traditionalism in the court. As he speaks to the justices about the natural freedom of humanity, he walks around the room gesturing to busts of past Presidents, including that of his father. John Adams supplements rational arguments for freedom with the traditions of liberty in the still young United States. He warns the justices that the identity of American citizens is at stake in the trial, that they must acquit the Africans in order to renew the nation in its commitment to freedom. What I find remarkable in this scene is its blending of liberal citizenship and traditional identity formation. In the magic of the movies, with the practice of cutting and splicing, of making links which are difficult to experience outside the theater, Spielberg has his cake of natural rights freedom and eats it too, as particularist identity politics. We might say that today the figure of the citizen joins together the autonomous individuality of modernity with the postmodern traditionalism of identity politics. Is this most ungainly blend, we might ask, suitable to conditions of an emerging planetary politics of the twenty-first century? In particular, what is the fate of modern and postmodern political identity when communication takes place in the borderless world of the internet?
|Nation and Citizen|
The citizen as an autonomous being had been articulated as the nature of man in the Enlightenment, achieving its best expression in Descartes. A being separate from the world of material objects, defined by rationality, outside any social integument - this Cartesian subject was the prerequisite of the citizen. The complexities, difficulties and ironies of this historic change are captured well by Balibar in his term "citizen subject." For this subject was a transformation of the older "subject" of the monarchy, a relative and subordinated being, into an active, independent and universal agent. The argument for such a radical redefinition of the term was accompanied, however, by the historic need to exclude women, children, slaves and non-whites more generally. The citizen subject then was of necessity somewhat indeterminate, a category between the universal and the empirical, at once real and effective enough to promote the making of a revolution but also contingent and empty enough a sign to remain a possibility for realization in the future. The citizen subject came into being not as an emanation of a Cartesian idea but in the dilatory, imperfect forge of massive political transformation. Balibar defines the contingent element in the category of citizen as follows:
To demonstrate the contingent nature of the figure of the citizen, Balibar traces the dialectical history of the citizen through its transformation during the period of the national welfare state. He depicts the expansion of the civil rights of the citizen during the twentieth century, through the class conflicts that come under the term socialism. What in the nineteenth century may have been the private domain of "man" - labor contracts, old age, health conditions, family reproductive practices - became in the twentieth century in much of Europe and the United States a question of citizenship. Balibar holds up this history to the mirror of the present where the issue of immigration is hotly contested, in France around the question of sub-Saharan Africans and north Africans from former colonies. He calls for a new expansion of citizenship, paradoxically, that is "without community." He urges a politics of citizenship for the global age in which no one could be excluded from citizenship and its rights due to the community of their birth. (Balibar 2001) But, notwithstanding Balibar's argument, I wonder if the term citizen, contingent though it has been, may continue to serve as the sign of the democratizing subject in the current conjuncture. While Balibar would reanimate the citizen against the gate-keeping tendency of the nation state, I would question the continued viability of the term. Does the term citizen carry with it a baggage of connotations from Western history that render it parochial in the present, globalized situation?
The issue of immigration, although very general around the planet, is played out differently in each case. Europe takes down its national borders to form a larger European Community that can compete economically with the United States and Japan. At the same time, regional struggles in the former Yugoslavia, in the former Soviet Union, in Ireland, in the Basque region, in Belgium and elsewhere indicate tendencies toward new and smaller national units. In Western Europe however history introduces a new form of the return of the repressed: peoples of former European colonies tread on European soil in a reversal of the invasion by conquistadors and imperialists of the past half millennium. The irony in this phenomenon is lost on most Europeans, on the conservative nationalists of course, but even on the left who might argue that Europe now is reaping its due returns. If one switches focus to the United States, the picture is far different. Here a nation of immigrants is now so "mixed" - more than half the population of California is of non-European origin - that the term nation no longer refers to a homogeneous people in any sense of the term. In Taiwan, again by contrast, the waves of Chinese immigrants who marginalized the native Haca population and could think of themselves only as Chinese wistfully imagining a return to the mainland, now proclaim themselves "Taiwanese" as if national identity is created by acts of a legislature or executive fiat. One could go on to enumerate at length the paradoxes of national identity and citizenship. But the question is clear: how much liberty can governments take in defining their national referent before the term itself becomes laughable?
The nation, one support of the citizen, is now being superseded, challenged, and displaced by processes of globalization, as Saskia Sassen convincingly argues, both in its territoriality and in its sovereignty. (Sassen 1998: 81) Multinational and transnational corporations cause nation states to adjust to their profit-oriented imperatives. New global organizations like the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization, however much they are influenced by the United States and other powerful nations, bypass to some degree national juridical institutions in the regulation of trade. Similarly, international rights organizations like Greenpeace, Médecins du Monde, Human Rights organizations, and other NGOs, instantiate political relations outside national control. Could it be that in this process the citizen will be surpassed by the person, and earthlings will be recognized as a determinate human grouping more than as a figure in science fiction novels and films? In this context, when claims for human rights are being at least somewhat successfully constructed as a global norm, we need to examine the role of the media in globalizing practices that construct new subjects. We need especially to examine those media that cross national boundaries to inquire if they form or may form the basis for a new set of political relations.
In this endeavor, one must be careful to avoid the perspective of existing political formations such as the nation, as well as political movements outside the nation that are opposed to it and bound to it at the same time. The new media, from these perspectives, merely reinforce or threaten territorial political relations. The important question is rather this: can the new media promote the construction of new political forms not tied to historical, territorial powers? What are the characteristics of new media that promote new political relations and new political subjects? How can these be furthered or enhanced by political action?
|Netizen and Citizen|
In contrast to the citizen of the nation, the name often given to the political subject constituted in cyberspace is "netizen." Netizen may only be a partial term because no one lives in the net permanently, at least not yet (who knows what may emerge from the genome project and experiments with virtual life?). Yet the netizen might be the formative figure in a new kind of political relation, one that shares allegiance to the nation with allegiance to the net and to the planetary political spaces it inaugurates. Certain structural features of the internet encourage, promote or at least allow exchanges across national borders.
Like other media such as the telephone, radio and television, the internet deterritorializes exchanges, extracting them from bodily location. But the internet reterritorializes exchanges in a manner different from those other media. Broadcast media such as radio and television are centralized at points of emission. These points are located in national space and may be regulated and controlled by nation states. The architecture of the internet, by contrast, is that of a decentralized web. Any point may establish exchanges with any other point or points, a configuration that makes it very difficult if not impossible to control by the nation state. The telephone system, by contrast with broadcast media, is bidirectional, reterritorializing exchanges as point to point voices. The internet differs from the telephone by including text (admittedly FAX does this) as well as images, expanding the dimensions of the exchange. Also, on the internet the exchange is digital, affording considerable advantages over the analogue telephone conversation. On the internet one may access not simply phone numbers but vast stores of information, information which, in digital form, may also be altered on its reception and retransmitted. Unlike the telephone, the internet encourages a new cultural practice of resignification, something possible in the small agricultural communities of the past but then limited to the immediate members of the group. Folk music exemplified this form of cultural practice which now may have become general. Further, the internet makes it far easier to send messages to multiple recipients, like broadcast media, but also to afford multiple emitters, unlike broadcast media. In all of these ways, the internet contains the potential of new practices. The process of realizing this potential is, it must be emphasized, a political one.
|The Net as a Tool|
Against the argument for the netizen, the objection might be raised that the internet promotes, even enhances, existing political formations. The Zapatistas, and the neo-Nazis alike, further their political ambitions by means of webpages, listservs, email, chat rooms, and so forth. In heavily mediatized societies political candidates of all stripes deploy the net to their advantage. Reform movements in China and Eastern Europe have depended on the net, as well as other media such as fax and television, to spread their word and foster political change. Countless experiments which use the net to extend democratic processes could be named, such as the City of Santa Monica's Public Electronic Network. (Rheingold 1993: 268ff) The demonstrations in Seattle early in the year 2000 against the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, as well as the general process of globalization, also benefitted by the ability of the net to aid the work of organizing political protest. These examples all bespeak the ways in which the internet can function within existing political structures.
Many examples also might be cited in which the net functions to affect new types of political movements that are unique to it. Laura Gurak shows how the protests against Lotus Marketplace and the Clipper Chip introduced new forms of political action which relied upon features particular to cyberspace. (Gurak 1997) In these cases opposition to corporate actions and state policies was organized primarily on the net. A simple email to friends, by someone who drew attention to privacy questions related to a database of consumers in production at Lotus Corporation, grew into a heavy flurry of email protests. Eventually this led the President of Lotus Corporation - after he figured out how to access his email - to drop the project. The case of the Clipper Chip was somewhat different. Here several organizations concerned with the internet, such as the Electronic Freedom Frontier, organized an email protest against the Clinton administration's effort to grab control of communications on the net by deploying a special computer chip which would allow it and it alone to decode all messages. In this instance the protest was somewhat successful.
These cases illustrate the way the speed, the rhetorical traits and the connectivity of the net can be used to organize social movements. Gurak suggests that the net affords the possibility of new forms of political mobilization. In both instances she studies, however, what is at issue is protest against modern institutions, the corporation and the state, not the development of new political bonds inscribed in the new human/machine interface.
|The Materiality of Media|
A second objection to my argument for the netizen might be that media merely mediate. One might point to the long history of sanguine expectations surrounding the introduction of new media which have only ended in disappointment in the results of their dissemination. At least since the telegraph, observers have argued for utopian consequences - global peace, the harmony of mankind, the elimination of inequality - from the invention and spread of media of communication. Many conclude that media are simply tools, neutral devices that change nothing of the structures of domination prevailing before them. These positions overlook the deep cultural and social changes ensuing from the media, even if these are regrettable rather than utopian. Who can doubt the role of print and television in the formation of modern society, each producing through myriad practices of appropriation profound alterations in the way people think, fantasize and behave?
The brunt of the argument against the importance of the media does not concern their effects. These are beyond doubt. Rather it has to do with the ontology of symbolization in general. If the motor of cultural existence is consciousness, then media are merely facilitators, playing little role in the form of exchange. If language is the basis of culture, then there are two possible positions: either language mediates symbol formation in a material process of alteration, or the specific wrapping of language affects the structuring of cultural subjects. I follow the line of thought of Marshall McLuhan in arguing for the latter position. I cannot here fully develop this assertion but to an audience of literary critics and humanists more generally, I maintain that a novel does not constitute subjects in the same manner as digitized narratives inscribed in the net. If you harbor any doubts about this, I ask that you think about copyright law and its current dissolution in cyberspace. Or perhaps inquire of an executive in the music industry about the difference between its commodities (LPs, tapes, CDs) and mp3 files. Or perhaps ask someone in the film industry, which is zealously digitizing its products and disseminating them as DVDs, if he or she thinks the internet elicits any anxiety about the difference of the media.
I am reduced to these facetious phrases because Humanists too often are wont to diminish the cultural significance of technical innovations (I cannot say if this itself derives from the culture of the book).
I am not suggesting that the political space that is opening or may be opened on the internet is a utopian realm of equality and freedom. Far from it. Each area of the internet, from email to chat rooms to MOOs to webpages to listservs to databases, contains its own forms of hierarchy and control, manipulations and risks. In chat rooms, as Katherine Hayles reminds me, many forms of political presence characteristic of the nation state are reproduced. In electronic messages, one must sustain one's identity, even if it is invented for the purpose of that encounter. In the same vein, chat rooms entail a means for the assignment of responsibility. These echoes of the world of territorial politics are nonetheless mediated by networked information machines and do not reproduce exactly the politics of earlier epochs.
But there is one political novelty specific to the internet that I highlight. The internet holds the prospect of serving to introduce post-national political forms because of its internal architecture, its new register of time and space, its new relation of human to machine, of body to mind, its new imaginary, and its new articulation of culture and reality. Despite what may appear in the media of newsprint and television as a celebration of the internet's harmony with the institutions of the nation state and the globalizing economy, new media offer possibilities for the construction of planetary political subjects, netizens who will be multiple, dispersed and virtual, nodes of a network of collective intelligence. (Lévy 1997) They may resemble neither the autonomous agent of citizenship, beholden to print, nor the identity of postmodernity, beholden to broadcast media. The political formation of the netizen is already well underway, bringing forth, as Heidegger might say, a humanity adhering not to nature alone but also to machines, not to geographically local identity alone but also to the digitized packets of its own electronic communications.
The import of these speculations is not to assert the existence of an ideal domain of human communication in cyberspace, nor is it even to suggest that the prospects for the improvement of the human condition are significantly enhanced in this network. It is rather to call attention to the possibility for the establishment of global communications, a system that is more practically dispersed across the globe than previous systems, one that is inherently bi-directional and ungovernable by existing political structures. And it is to call attention to the need to rethink our understanding of terms like the citizen that derive from cultural worlds in which information machines were limited to books, periodicals, paintings and mechanical clocks; in short, to take into account what Félix Guattari felicitously terms "the machinic heterogenesis" of the human. (Guattari 1993)
 See Etienne Balibar's magnificent essay, "Citizen Subject," in E. Cadava, P. Connor and J.-L. Nancy (eds), Who Comes After the Subject? (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp.33-57. Also of great interest is Balibar's "Subjection and Subjectivation," in J. Copjec (ed.), Supposing the Subject (New York: Verso, 1994), pp.1-15.
 I refer to the comments of Katherine Hayles to the panel at which I presented an early version of this paper during the MLA of 2000 in Washington, D.C.
Balibar, E. (1991). "Citizen Subject." E. Cadava, P. Connor and J.-L. Nancy (eds). Who Comes After the Subject? New York: Routledge, pp.33-57.
Balibar, E. (1994). Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx. New York: Routledge.
Balibar, E. (2001). "Une Citoyenneté sans communauté?" Nous, Citoyens d'Europe. Paris: Editions de La Découverte, pp.111-150.
Derrida, J. (1986). "Declarations of Independence." New Political Science, vol.15, pp.7-15.
Derrida, J. (1994). Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International. New York: Routledge.
Guattari, F. (1993). "Machinic Heterogenesis." V. Conley (ed.). Rethinking Technologies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Gurak, L. (1997). Persuasion and Privacy in Cyberspace: The Online Protests over Lotus Marketplace and the Clipper Chip. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lévy, P. (1997). Collective Intelligence. New York: Plenum Press.
Marx, K. (1967). "On the Jewish Question." L. Easton and K. Guddat (eds). Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society. New York: Anchor, pp.216-248.
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Sassen, S. (1998). Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: The New Press.
Sieyès, E. J. (1789). Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état? Paris: none.