Mots pluriels
    No 18. August 2001.
    https://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP1801do.html
    © Dana Ott & Lane Smith.

    Tipping the scales?
    The influence of the Internet on state-society relations in Africa

    Dana Ott [1]
    US Agency for International Development

    With contributions from
    Lane Smith
    US Agency for International Development

    What governments should really fear is not rebels
    in the jungle but a communications expert.
    - Linda Main

    Governments are irritated about the Internet. Although they recognize that the Internet
    bears the prospect of substantial economic wealth for their societies, they find its
    libertarian culture and contempt for national borders subversive and frankly terrifying.
    - Marc Holitscher

    The competition between market forces and national security needs
    will characterize the contest for Internet control.
    - Giampiero Giacomello

    It could be argued that growth in speculation about the impact of the Internet on modern society is exceeded only by the growth of the Internet itself. Articles routinely trumpet the perceived positive aspects of the Net, such as its supposedly decentralized, empowering nature, or the triumph of the global information infrastructure (Holitscher; Hoffman 2001; Halavais 2000). More recent analyses have highlighted potential problems of this global communications system, from the promotion of "American values" to the potential imperialism of a global e-commerce system and the need to "tame the net" through global governance (Giacomello; Main 2001).

    And yet, many of these studies focus narrowly on the technical side of Internet development, with intricate discussions of bandwidth and packet-switching; or they engage in intellectual discourse about the effect of the Internet on the nation-state as a theoretical construct (Holitscher; Lloyd 2000). Less has been said about the effect that growth in Internet access is having on the relationship between state and society, particularly in the developing countries of Africa, and what the implications are for the political and economic development of these states.

    In this article we discuss some of the impacts of the spread of the Internet on state-society relations in Africa. Specifically, we argue that the most profound effect of the Internet in these developing countries is to shift the balance of power between states and citizens, altering not only the "terms of the debate" if you will, but perhaps the debate itself. Looking at examples in Africa, we observe the consequences of these changing relationships played out in the political, economic and social arenas. Finally, we offer some suggestions on future trends.

    Any discussion of the impact of the Internet in Africa requires a little perspective on the relative "spread" of the Internet to Africa as compared to the rest of the world. According to the latest report by Mike Jensen (2001), as of November 2000, all 54 countries and territories in Africa had achieved permanent connectivity. In addition, Nigeria's recent liberalization of telecom regulation holds the potential to vastly expand access and affordability in Africa's most populous state. Recent estimates of the total number of Internet subscribers in Africa are around 1.3 million. Of these, approximately 250,000 are in North Africa, and 750,000 in South Africa, with 300,000 divided among the remaining countries. The total number of users is estimated to be about 4 million - which works out to 1 per 200 people, compared with 1 to 30 worldwide and 1 to 3 in North America/Europe. Nonetheless, the growth of cybercafés throughout Africa is strong, which provides access to much larger numbers of people by removing the equipment barrier, though high cost remains an issue. The largest groups of users in Africa are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private companies and universities.

    Ironically, despite the more limited overall access to the Internet in these less developed countries, its impact is disproportionately greater because of the widespread problem of lack of access to information generally. For example, in African countries where democracy is a relatively new concept, access to a variety of information sources remains a challenge. Governments often control traditional means of communication, such as radio, newspapers or television; they may do so either directly (through regulations restricting private ownership) or indirectly (by raising the costs of obtaining licenses, newsprint, etc., for independent news media). In fact, even the most restrictive countries in Africa, such as Chad, Eritrea, and Sudan, allow the existence of independent media, though many, such as Zimbabwe, use regulatory boards to limit the number of private media that are allowed to operate. Moreover, in most of these countries the regulatory environment in which the independent press operates is sufficiently restrictive - with numerous laws against all manner of things such as sedition, threats to national security, "professional errors," etc. - and interpretation of these laws is sufficiently broad so as to effect widespread self-censorship. More subtle, but equally effective, is the imposition of extremely high licensing fees for both print media and radio, such as in The Gambia, and more recently Uganda and Kenya. In other countries like Namibia and Zambia, economic pressure has been applied to the independent press through withdrawal of government advertising, or import duties on equipment such as printing presses.

    The Internet has provided exposure to a myriad of alternative viewpoints on a regular basis for the first time in many countries. The growth in Internet access throughout Africa and the fact that such access is rarely restricted, even in countries that impose significant constraints on print and broadcast media, may be a reflection of its relative newness, and lack of knowledge on the part of governments about how to control it. In the short run, this has allowed the independent media in many countries to take advantage of this window of opportunity to establish a significant presence online. A quick check reveals 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa which have one (or more) newspapers available on the Net. Many of the countries with online papers are not known for a liberal press environment. And yet these sites exist, and continue to operate. A recent study notes:

      It is interesting that most countries that have allowed Internet access have tolerated freer expression online than is permitted in the local news media. Stories that newspapers have declined to publish because of political pressure have circulated widely on the Internet. (Main 2001: 84)

    This is echoed by the first ever comprehensive review of Internet freedom around the world by Freedom House, as part of its annual review of press freedom. The author of this year's report, Leonard Sussman, notes that:

      many traditionally authoritative countries now permit relatively unrestricted use of the Internet by citizens, while several of the most democratic states attempt to impose restrictions on the Internet in the name of protecting national security and public decency … in some nations there is significant negative correlation between censorship of print and broadcast media and policies regarding the Internet. (Sussman 2001: 1)

    This is not to say that governments are unaware of the threat. But controlling the Internet is proving to be somewhat awkward for governments using traditional methods. Even when they are savvy enough to want to control online content, it is difficult in practice. A good example of this occurred in Zambia in 1996. It was an election year, and there was already significant political tension between the government and opposition parties over a variety of issues. The Post, an independent newspaper with a confrontational style, published an article on February 5, stating that the cabinet was secretly planning to hold a referendum on the constitution without giving the public sufficient warning.[2] In response, the Chiluba government banned the issue, searched the offices of The Post, and arrested the Editor-In-Chief, Fred M'membe, the Managing Editor, Bright Mwape, and the Special Projects Editor, Masautso Phiri. The three were charged under the "Official Secrets Act" with receiving and possessing classified information. However, the authorities neglected to focus on the other version of the article that was available, namely the online edition, and its removal from the web did not occur until 3 days later on February 8. Even when it was finally taken down, the authorities apparently failed to consider how porous national borders had become: the banned issue could still be viewed on one of hundreds of sites outside the country and outside the government's control. The ultimate irony in this case is that the actions of the government and the response of the society (principally those citizens who emailed the details to others beyond the borders) created a far greater circulation for this story than it might otherwise have enjoyed.

    The lessons of Zambia and other countries have not been lost on their contemporaries. In some cases, governments are gaining ground in terms of their ability to control the Internet as a tool for independent and (often) political expression. This is facilitated when the government is the owner of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and can control the content that is accessible to citizens. A recent article on China in the Christian Science Monitor argues that:

      far from using web access to import ideas that are challenging or even disrupting, China's management [of the Internet] is serving to support and reinforce the Chinese system. Chinese security and propaganda agencies have been able to set limits without launching major crackdowns, cutting cables to the outside world, or closing the major service providers or web sites. (Marquand 2001: 10)

    In other words, the Chinese use a multifaceted approach to the Internet, controlling both content and access. Content is controlled by monitors in chat rooms, filtering software that blocks specific sites, and regulation of content on local sites. Access is widespread but Internet cafes that "cross the line" and do not follow the numerous guidelines, including blocking access to specific sites, are promptly shut down. The Communist Party has even utilized the Internet to further its own internal coordination and networking. It can only be a matter of time before other states concerned about the impact of the Internet learn to apply these techniques. The sophistication of control over the Internet demonstrated by China may be a harbinger of things to come in Africa. Another study argues that because the Communist Party in China has been "proactive" in its approach to the Internet as a tool to be developed within certain parameters, this has facilitated the Party's ability to control its evolution in China (Kalathil & Boas 2001).

    By contrast, the impact of the Internet in the developed countries of Europe and North America has been primarily in the realm of electronic commerce. The rather freer flow of information in these countries, and the already existing avenues for political participation, mean that the Internet has not significantly affected ordinary people's political interaction with the state, though it has strengthened the ability of marginalized and fringe groups to network - with mixed results. Although it has been argued that bringing marginalized groups together can positively affect their ability to become politically active, which is assumed to be a benefit to representation, at the same time this encourages greater cleavages within societies as individuals begin to self-identify more and more narrowly. If the definition of a nation-state is the coincidence of geography and culture, then the segmentation of societies through the Internet could have negative implications for the nation-state as we now know it. In addition, the role of the Internet in allowing groups with violent or otherwise threatening intentions (such as hate groups or terrorist organizations) to better coordinate and network has been well documented by organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League, the Simon Wiesenthal Center and the Southern Poverty Law Center (also see Goldberg; Page 2000).

    State-Society Relationships in the Internet Era

    We believe that the Internet can and does profoundly affect the political relationship between state and society in Africa in much the same way that globalization has affected the economic one - by removing power from the exclusive possession of the state and dispersing it outward, not only to society in general but to external actors as well. While this change is desirable in the long run, it presents serious short-term challenges as state and society struggle to redefine their roles within the old framework of the nation-state. As we have seen in the transitions to democracy around the world, any shift in the balance of power within a state carries the potential for severe political disruption. The risk is particularly great in Africa, where states have already experienced extreme fluidity in the state-society relationship during the previous decade of "democratization." This is compounded by the fact that these states were creations of the colonial era, and in many cases have never been entirely under the control of their leaders. As a recent Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) report notes:

      Today, the surfeit of arms and lack of control over national territories has resulted in much of sub-Saharan Africa being characterized not by the state's monopoly over the instruments of coercion, but by a balance of force between the state and the community. The result, in a highly armed and violent continent, ironically, is the creation of a security vacuum. (ECA 2001)

    And yet it is clear that with or without the Internet, a shift in the power relationships between society and state in Africa is inevitable as the move towards more liberalized political systems demands it. The battle over the institutionalization of the Internet in some African countries thus often mirrors the battle over political liberalization itself.

    In Africa and elsewhere, elite pacts - defined as situations where elites see advantages to a negotiated solution of transferring power rather than fighting to retain it - have proven to be one method by which political change has occurred without violence. What is not clear, however, is whether such pacts could be utilized to minimize the potential for political violence nowadays, when the threat to elites is not only political but economic as well. The global economy dramatically lessens the ability of elites within states to control economic assets: specifically, it is not possible to be part of the global economy without permitting the mobility of capital. Mobility of capital imposes its own set of conditions, i.e. there must be stability and good governance which provide the promise of a significant return on investment. This entails a number of requirements in terms of privatization, anti-corruption and political liberalization that undermine the traditional economic monopoly of elites in developing countries. As a consequence, elites have less incentive to sacrifice political power in the interests of securing their economic dominance. At the same time, within the state, this diffusion of power and authority has strengthened societal actors. As Holitscher notes, with reference to Mathews (1997):

      cyberspace advantages private actors relative to the state in many ways and further weakens governments’ capability of top-down command and control. As such, the decentralizing dynamic of [the] Internet is likely to multiply the number of actors who matter and to reduce the number of those who command great authority ... (Holitscher)

    However, in general it is not clear that participating in the global economy produces the gains for these developing countries that are typically touted by institutions such as the World Bank. One recent report produced by a consortium called the Digital Opportunity Initiative argues that Internet technology can promote development only if five other conditions are in place: quality infrastructure, favorable government policies, good education, local relevance, and a culture of entrepreneurship (Accenture et al 2001). Some have claimed that globalization is reinforcing the current balance of economic power among states rather than redistributing it. Linda Main observes:

      in reality the Internet concentrates economic activity and power more narrowly in one group. As a result there is a real risk that we are moving towards a two-tier technology society that perpetuates the old distinctions between North and South. (Main 2001: 83)

    The Internet and the larger processes of globalization are clearly affecting the relationship of society and state in Africa, though there are varying tendencies to be observed. How the political and economic development of these states will be affected in the long run remains to be seen.

    A Few Final Thoughts

    The ECA Report notes that:

      In recent years, on-line discussions have helped expand the range of participation and multiply the impact of Africa-wide meetings: notably the 40th anniversary meeting of the ECA in 1998 [which] focused on women in development, and the ECA's annual African Development Forums highlighting information technology (1999) and HIV/AIDS (2000). The ECA/APIC Roundtable showed that, despite Africa's lag in internet connectivity, there is already a critical mass of Africans - in almost every African country - who are sufficiently well connected to participate actively in international electronic debates. (ECA 2001)

    Broadly-distributed reports like this, which highlight many of the challenges facing Africa and clearly pinpoint problem areas (such as governance and corruption), undermine the efforts of even the most repressive governments to prevent their citizens from hearing what others are saying about them. As noted earlier, the Internet is available in every country in Africa and while the majority of citizens may not have direct access, there are organizations (such as NGOs) which can retrieve information and distribute it throughout the community, either through print media or increasingly through community radio. The latter is becoming more and more popular, and allows for much easier distribution of information in a format (such as local languages) suitable for wide dissemination. Furthermore, because these fora represent Africans commenting on the state of their own continent, it is far more difficult for the political leadership to dismiss these comments out of hand, using the typical arguments of colonialism or imperialism.

    A recent editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle highlights the nexus where political and economic imperatives meet:

      Governments around the world must recognize that the Net is the gateway to the global economy. But many are confronted with a Hobson's choice, between controlling information and joining the world marketplace. The Internet poses threats to authority, and in some cases, governments impose a range of legal and regulatory actions intended to shape the Internet. Government policymakers will have to learn that less regulation inevitably translates into greater e-commerce. (Hoffman & Berman 2001: A-17)

    And it is here, at this nexus, where those of us who are development policy makers and practitioners need to be most energetic. Few countries have found the "Golden Mean" where inexpensive and widespread access is coupled with sufficiently punitive consequences to effectively control citizen access to anti-regime information and networks. Several African countries, including Senegal, Uganda and Nigeria, have taken the lead in promoting affordable access to the Internet and the powerful information and communication tools that it offers. They have empowered the private sector, both at the retail Internet Service Provider level and at that of the corner telephone kiosk, encouraging competition to make a broad array of information-related services available. Their citizens are free to - and do - make use of the Net to advance their economic, political and social interests. The governments of these countries have been willing to face the risk to established interests - including themselves - because they believe that they can win the information fight. They adhere to the "Good offense is the best defense" strategy, believing they can counterbalance negative information about their regimes with positive news and their side of the story.

    Other countries, such as Eritrea and Sudan, while aware of the potential economic boost that the Internet represents, shy away from these market-opening steps, for fear of undermining the political and economic status quo. However, the very processes they are resisting will lead to the downfall of that strategy. Factors such as the increasing mobility of African businesspeople and the globalization of markets are leading to vastly greater consumer awareness of the pricing and availability of the Internet in neighboring countries. This, in turn, is increasing consumer pressure and dissatisfaction with elements of the status quo such as long queues for telephone lines, corruption, high prices and poor services. This increased dissatisfaction builds pressure for change, and in several African countries, major policy breakthroughs can be attributed in part to such heightened consumer demands.

    The task facing development practitioners, therefore, is to continue to build awareness in these countries - on the part of policy makers, influential consumers such as businesspeople, and the general public - of the relative ease with which the shortage of access can be remedied, and the long-term benefits that may result.

    As with all technologies, the value of the Internet is ultimately dependent on the skills of those who use it. We have seen that some countries have chosen to view it as another threat to hegemony, and responded accordingly. Some may opt to follow their example because of similar fears. Others have sought to take advantage of the opportunities the Internet presents for greater communication, e-commerce, and trade. There are powerful arguments about both the benefits and the costs of this technology, particularly with regard to the state-society relationship. But it must be remembered that this is a relatively young technology. Even some of the most imaginative thinkers did not predict the role that the personal computer would play in our lives. Similarly, we have only just begun to imagine the possibilities that the Internet and other technologies hold to transform the way the world defines itself. We cannot know the future, but we believe that at the very least, the Internet represents a potent force for political, economic and social change.

    Notes

    [1] The views expressed here are the opinions of the authors and do not represent official policy of the US Agency for International Development.

    [2] The online archive of The Post is currently under construction at https://www.post.co.zm/search.html, but the editors will respond to email requests for particular back issues.

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    Dana Ott is a Democracy Specialist in the Bureau for Africa of the Office of Sustainable Development, at the US Agency for International Development in Washington, DC. Her recent publications include the country profiles on Mauritius, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia, Sudan, Ghana and Namibia, as well as profiles of The Daily Observer newspaper and Kenneth Best, in the forthcoming Censorship: A World Encyclopedia (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers); Small is Democratic (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000); "The Electronic Republic? The Role of the Internet in Promoting Democracy in Africa," with Melissa Rosser, in Democratization, vol.7, no.1, spring 2000; and Power to the People: The Role of Electronic Media in Promoting Democracy in Africa in First Monday, vol.3, no.4, April 1998.
    Lane Smith has nineteen years of international development experience with the US Government. He has served as the Coordinator of the Leland Initiative since its inception in 1996; this is the USAID Bureau for Africa effort to bring the benefits of the information revolution to the people of Africa, through connection to the Internet and other GII technologies. He has worked extensively to embed modern information and communication approaches into White House initiatives, including the following: the Education for Development and Democracy Initiative (EDDI), the Africa Trade and Investment Policy Project (ATRIP) and the EAGER economic research project. In addition, Lane has served as a principal informant for broader US Government approaches to bridge the Digital Divide, including the Internet for Economic Development Initiative.
    Further information about USAID can be found on the agency's website at https://www.usaid.gov/, while the Bureau for Africa/Office for Sustainable Development is at https://www.afr-sd.org/.

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