Is the Internet a wonderful development for democracy? In many ways it certainly is. As a result of the Internet, people can learn far more than they could before, and they can learn it much faster. If you are interested in issues that bear on public policy - environmental quality, wages over time, motor vehicle safety - you can find what you need to know in a matter of seconds. If you are suspicious of the mass media, and want to discuss issues with like-minded people, you can do that, transcending the limitations of geography in ways that could barely be imagined even a decade ago. And if you want to get information to a wide range of people, you can do that, via email or websites; this is another sense in which the Internet is a great boon for democracy.
But in the midst of the celebration, I want to raise a note of caution. I do so by emphasizing one of the most striking powers provided by emerging technologies: the growing power of consumers to "filter" what they see. As a result of the Internet, and other technological developments, many people are increasingly engaged in the process of "personalization," which limits their exposure to topics and points of view of their own choosing. They filter in, and they also filter out, with unprecedented powers of precision. Consider just a few examples:
2. Sonicnet.com allows you to create your own musical universe, consisting of what it calls "Me Music." Me Music is "A place where you can listen to the music you love on the radio station YOU create ... A place where you can watch videos of your favorite artists and new artists ...."
3. Zatso.com allows users to produce "a personal newscast." Its intention is to create a place "where you decide what's news." Your task is to state "what TV news stories you're interested in," and Zatso.com turns that information into a specifically designed newscast. From the main "This is the News I Want" menu, you can choose stories with particular words and phrases, or you can select topics, such as sports, weather, crime, health, government/politics, and many more.
4. Info Xtra offers "news and entertainment that's important to you," and it allows you to find this "without hunting through newspapers, radio and websites." Personalized news, local weather, and "even your daily horoscope or winning lottery number" will be delivered to you once you specify what you want and when you want it.
5. TiVo, a television recording system, is designed, in the words of its website, to give "you the ultimate control over your TV viewing." It does this by putting "you at the center of your own TV network, so you'll always have access to whatever you want, whenever you want." TiVo "will automatically find and digitally record your favorite programs every time they air" and will help you create "your personal TV line-up." It will also learn your tastes, so that it can "suggest other shows that you may want to record and watch based on your preferences."
6. Intertainer, Inc. provides "home entertainment services on demand," not limited to television but also including music, movies, and shopping. Intertainer is intended for people who want "total control" and "personalized experiences." It is "a new way to get whatever movies, music, and television you want anytime you want on your PC or TV."
7. George Bell, the chief executive officer of the search engine Excite, exclaims, "We are looking for ways to be able to lift chunks of content off other areas of our service and paste them onto your personal page so you can constantly refresh and update that `newspaper of me.' About 43 percent of our entire user data base has personalized their experience on Excite."
Of course these developments make life much more convenient and in some ways much better: we all seek to reduce our exposure to uninvited noise. But from the standpoint of democracy, filtering is a mixed blessing. An understanding of the mix will permit us to obtain a better sense of what makes for a well-functioning system of free expression. Above all, I urge that in a heterogeneous society, such a system requires something other than free, or publicly unrestricted, individual choices. On the contrary, it imposes two distinctive requirements. First, people should be exposed to materials that they would not have chosen in advance. Unanticipated encounters, involving topics and points of view that people have not sought out and perhaps find quite irritating, are central to democracy and even to freedom itself. Second, many or most citizens should have a range of common experiences. Without shared experiences, a heterogeneous society will have a much more difficult time addressing social problems; people may even find it hard to understand one another.
|A Thought Experiment|
To see the issue, let us engage in a thought experiment: an apparently utopian dream, that of complete individuation, in which consumers can entirely personalize (or "customize") their own communications universe.
Imagine, that is, a system of communications in which each person has unlimited power of individual design. If people want to watch news all the time, they would be entirely free to do exactly that. If they dislike news, and want to watch football in the morning and situation comedies at night, that would be fine too. If people care only about America, and want to avoid international issues completely, that would be very simple indeed; so too if they care only about New York, or Chicago, or California. If people want to restrict themselves to certain points of view, by limiting themselves to conservatives, moderates, liberals, vegetarians, or Nazis, that would be entirely feasible with a simple "point and click." If people want to isolate themselves, and speak only with like-minded others, that is possible too.
At least as a matter of technological feasibility, our communications market is moving rapidly toward this apparently utopian picture. A number of newspapers allow readers to create filtered versions, containing exactly what they want, and no more. If you are interested in getting help with the design of an entirely individual paper, you can consult a number of sites, including individual.com and crayon.net. To be sure, the Internet greatly increases people's ability to expand their horizons, as millions of people are now doing; but many people are using it to produce narrowness, not breadth. Thus MIT professor Nicholas Negroponte refers to the emergence of "the Daily Me" - a communications package that is personally designed, with components fully chosen in advance.
Of course this is not wholly different from what has come before. People who read newspapers do not read the same newspaper; some people do not read any newspaper at all. People make choices among magazines based on their tastes and their point of view. But in the emerging situation, there is a difference of degree if not of kind. What is different is a dramatic increase in individual control over content, and a corresponding decrease in the power of general interest intermediaries, including newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters. For all their problems, and their unmistakable limitations and biases, these intermediaries have performed some important democratic functions.
People who rely on such intermediaries have a range of chance encounters, involving shared experience with diverse others, and also exposure to material that they did not specifically choose. You might, for example, read the city newspaper, and in the process come across stories that you would not have selected if you had the power to control what you see. Your eyes may encounter a story about Germany, or crime in Los Angeles, or innovative business practices in Tokyo, and you may read those stories although you would hardly have placed them in your "Daily Me." You might watch a particular television channel - perhaps you prefer channel 4 - and when your favorite program ends, you might see the beginning of another show, one that you would not have chosen in advance. Reading Time magazine, you might come across a discussion of endangered species in Madagascar, and this discussion might interest you, even affect your behavior, although you would not have sought it out in the first instance. A system in which individuals lack control over the particular content that they see has a great deal in common with a public street, where you might encounter not only friends, but a heterogeneous variety of people engaged in a wide array of activities (including, perhaps, political protests and begging).
In fact a risk with a system of perfect individual control is that it can reduce the importance of the "public sphere" and of common spaces in general. One of the essential features of such spaces is that they tend to ensure that people will encounter materials on important issues, whether or not they have specifically chosen the encounter. And when people see such materials, their interests and even their views might change as a result. At the very least, they will know a bit more about what their fellow citizens are thinking. As it happens, this point is closely connected with an important, and somewhat exotic, constitutional principle, to which I now turn.
|Public (and Private) Forums|
In the popular understanding, the free speech principle forbids government from "censoring" speech of which it disapproves. In the standard cases, the government attempts to impose penalties, whether civil or criminal, on political dissent, and on speech that it considers dangerous, libelous, or sexually explicit. The question is whether the government has a legitimate, and sufficiently weighty, basis for restricting the speech that it seeks to control.
But a central part of free speech law, with large implications for thinking about the Internet, takes a quite different form. The Supreme Court has held that streets and parks must be kept open to the public for expressive activity. Hence governments are obliged to allow speech to occur freely on public streets and in public parks - even if many citizens would prefer to have peace and quiet, and even if it seems irritating to come across protesters and dissidents whom one would like to avoid. To be sure, the government is allowed to impose restrictions on the "time, place, and manner" of speech in public places. No one has a right to use fireworks and loudspeakers on the public streets at midnight to complain about the size of the defense budget. But time, place, and manner restrictions must be both reasonable and limited, and government is essentially obliged to allow speakers, whatever their views, to use public property to convey messages of their choosing.
The public forum doctrine promotes three important functions. First, it ensures that speakers can have access to a wide array of people. If you want to claim that taxes are too high, or that police brutality against African-Americans is common, you can press this argument on many people who might otherwise fail to hear the message. Those who use the streets and parks are likely learn something about the substance of the argument urged by speakers; they might also learn the nature and intensity of views held by their fellow citizens. Perhaps their views will be changed; perhaps they will become curious, enough so to investigate the question on their own.
Second, the public forum doctrine allows speakers not only to have general access to heterogeneous people, but also to specific people, and specific institutions, with whom they have a complaint. Suppose, for example, that you believe that the state legislature has behaved irresponsibly with respect to crime or health care for children. The public forum ensures that you can make your views heard by legislators, simply by protesting in front of the state legislature itself.
Third, the public forum doctrine increases the likelihood that people generally will be exposed to a wide variety of people and views. When you go to work, or visit a park, it is possible that you will have a series of unexpected encounters, however fleeting or seemingly inconsequential. You cannot easily wall yourself off from contentions or conditions that you would have preferred to avoid. Here too the public forum doctrine tends to ensure a range of experiences that are widely shared - streets and parks are public property - and also a set of exposures to diverse circumstances. In a pluralistic democracy, an important shared experience is in fact the very experience of society's diversity. A central idea here must be that these exposures help promote understanding and perhaps in that sense freedom. And all of these points are closely connected to democratic ideals.
Of course there is a limit to how much can be done on streets and in parks. Even in the largest cities, streets and parks are insistently local. But many of the social functions of streets and parks, as public forums, are performed by other institutions too. In fact society's general interest intermediaries - newspapers, magazines, television broadcasters - can be understood as public forums of an especially important sort, perhaps above all because they expose people to new, unanticipated topics and points of view.
When you read a city newspaper or a national magazine, your eyes will come across a number of articles that you might not have selected in advance, and if you are like most people, you will read some of those articles. Perhaps you did not know that you might have an interest in minimum wage legislation, or Somalia, or the latest developments in the Middle East; but a story might catch your attention. What is true for topics is also true for points of view. You might think that you have nothing to learn from someone whose view you abhor; but once you come across the editorial pages, you might well read what they have to say, and you might well benefit from the experience. Perhaps you will be persuaded on one point or another. At the same time, the front page headline, or the cover story in Newsweek, is likely to have a high degree of salience for a wide range of people.
Television broadcasters have similar functions, perhaps above all what has become an institution: the evening news. If you tune into the evening news, you will learn about a number of topics that you would not have specifically chosen. Because of television's speech and immediacy, television broadcasters perform these public forum-type functions still more than general interest intermediaries in the print media. The "lead story" on the networks is likely to have a great deal of public salience, helping to define central issues, and creating a kind of shared focus of attention, for many millions of people. And what happens after the lead story - dealing with a menu of topics both domestically and internationally - creates something like a speakers' corner beyond anything imagined in Hyde Park. As a result, people's interest is sometimes piqued, and they might well become curious and follow up, perhaps changing their perspective in the process.
None of these claims depends on a judgment that general interest intermediaries are unbiased, or always do an excellent job, or deserve a monopoly over the world of communications. The Internet is a boon partly because it breaks that monopoly. So too for the proliferation of television and radio shows, and even channels, that have some specialized identity. (Consider the rise of Fox News, which appeals to a more conservative audience.) All that I am claiming is that general interest intermediaries expose people to a wide range of topics and views at the same time that they provide shared experiences for a heterogeneous public. Indeed, general interest intermediaries of this sort have large advantages over streets and parks precisely because most tend to be so much less local and so much more national, even international. Typically they expose people to questions and problems in other areas, even other nations.
|Specialization and Fragmentation|
The common framework for social experience provided by a system with public forums and general interest intermediaries will change significantly with the advent of a fragmented communications market. Consider some simple facts. If you take the ten most highly rated television programs for whites, and then take the ten most highly rated programs for African-Americans, you will find little overlap between them. Indeed, over half of the ten most highly rated programs for African-Americans rank among the ten least popular programs for whites. With respect to race, similar divisions can be found on the Internet. Not surprisingly, many people tend to choose like-minded sites and like-minded discussion groups. Many of those with committed views on one or another topic - gun control, abortion, affirmative action - speak mostly with each other. It is exceedingly rare for a site with an identifiable point of view to provide links to sites with opposing views; but it is very common for such a site to provide links to like-minded sites.
With a dramatic increase in options, and a greater power to customize, comes an increase in the range of actual choices. Those choices are likely, in many cases, to mean that people will try to find material that makes them feel comfortable, or that is created by and for people like themselves. This is what the "Daily Me" is all about. Of course many people also seek out new topics and ideas. And to the extent that people do not, the increase in options is hardly bad on balance; among other things, it will greatly enhance variety, the aggregate amount of information, and the entertainment value of actual choices. But there are serious risks as well. If diverse groups are seeing and hearing quite different points of view, or focussing on quite different topics, mutual understanding might be difficult, and it might turn out to be hard for people to solve problems that society as a whole faces. If millions of people are mostly listening to Rush Limbaugh, and learning about issues and speaking with one another via such outlets, and others are listening to Fox News, problems will arise with millions of other people who are mostly or only listening to people and stations with an altogether different point of view.
We can sharpen our understanding of this problem if we attend to the phenomenon of group polarization. The idea is that after deliberating with one another, people are likely to move toward a more extreme point in the direction to which they were previously inclined, as indicated by the median of their predeliberation judgments. With respect to the Internet, the implication is that groups of people, especially if they are like-minded, will end up thinking the same thing that they thought before - but in more extreme form.
Consider some examples of the basic phenomenon, which has been found in over a dozen nations. (a) After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid. (b) After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities. (c) After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more positive responses to the same question. (d) A group of moderately profeminist women will become more strongly profeminist after discussion. It follows that, for example, after discussion with one another, those inclined to think that President Clinton was a crook will be quite convinced of this point; that those inclined to favor more aggressive affirmative action programs will become quite extreme on the issue; that those who believe that tax rates are too high will come to think that large, immediate tax reductions are an extremely good idea.
The phenomenon of group polarization has conspicuous importance to the current communications market, where groups with distinctive identities increasingly engage in within-group discussion. If the public is balkanized, and if different groups design their own preferred communications packages, the consequence will be further balkanization, as group members move one another toward more extreme points in line with their initial tendencies. At the same time, different deliberating groups, each consisting of like-minded people, will be driven increasingly far apart. Extremist groups will often become more extreme.
Why does group polarization occur? There have been two main explanations, both of which have been extensively investigated. Massive support has been found on behalf of both.
The first explanation emphasizes the role of persuasive arguments, and of what is, and is not, heard within a group of like-minded people. It is based on a common sense idea: any individual's position on any issue is (fortunately!) a function, at least in part, of which arguments seem convincing. If your position is going to move as a result of group discussion, it is likely to move in the direction of the most persuasive position defended within the group, taken as a collectivity. Of course - and this is the key point - a group whose members are already inclined in a certain direction will offer a disproportionately large number of arguments supporting that same direction, and a disproportionately small number of arguments going the other way. The result of discussion will therefore be to move the group, taken as a collectivity, further in the direction of their initial inclinations. To be sure, individuals with the most extreme views will sometimes move toward a more moderate position. But the group as a whole moves, as a statistical regularity, to a more extreme position consistent with its predeliberation leanings.
The second explanation, involving social comparison, begins with the claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other group members, and also to perceive themselves favorably. Once they hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position. People may wish, for example, not to seem too enthusiastic, or too restrained, in their support for affirmative action, feminism, or an increase in national defense; hence their views may shift when they see what other people and in particular what other group members think.
Group polarization is a human regularity; but social context can increase, decrease, or even eliminate it. For present purposes, the most important point is that group polarization will significantly increase if people think of themselves, antecedently or otherwise, as part of a group having a shared identity and a degree of solidarity. If, for example, people in an Internet discussion group think of themselves as opponents of high taxes, or advocates of animal rights, their discussions are likely to move them in quite extreme directions. It is thinking of themselves as a group that makes polarization both more likely and more extreme. Hence significant movements should be expected for those who listen to a radio show known to be conservative, or a television program dedicated to traditional religious values, or to exposing white racism.
This should not be surprising. If ordinary findings of group polarization are a product of limited argument pools and social influences, it stands to reason that when group members think of one another as similar along a salient dimension, or if some external factor (politics, geography, race, sex) unites them, group polarization will be heightened.
Such polarization is occurring every day on the Internet. Indeed, it is clear that the Internet is serving, for many, as a breeding ground for extremism, precisely because like-minded people are deliberating with one another, without hearing contrary views. Hate groups are the most obvious example. Consider one extremist group, the so-called Unorganized Militia, the armed wing of the Patriot movement, "which believes that the federal government is becoming increasingly dictatorial with its regulatory power over taxes, guns and land use." A crucial factor behind the growth of the Unorganized Militia "has been the use of computer networks," allowing members "to make contact quickly and easily with like-minded individuals to trade information, discuss current conspiracy theories, and organize events." The Unorganized Militia has a large number of websites, and those sites frequently offer links to related sites. It is clear that websites are being used to recruit new members and to allow like-minded people to speak with one another and to reinforce existing convictions. It is also clear that the Internet is playing a crucial role in permitting people who would otherwise feel isolated, or move on to something else, to band together and to spread rumors, many of them paranoid and hateful.
There are numerous other examples along similar lines. A group naming itself the "White Racial Loyalists" calls on all "White Racial Loyalists to go to chat rooms and debate and recruit with NEW people, post our URL everywhere, as soon as possible." Another site announces that:
Of course we cannot say, from the mere fact of polarization, that there has been a movement in the wrong direction. Perhaps the more extreme tendency is better; indeed, group polarization is likely to have fueled many movements of great value, including, for example, the movement for civil rights, the antislavery movement, and the movement for sex equality. All of these were extreme in their time, and within-group discussion bred greater extremism; but extremism need not be a word of opprobrium. If greater communications choices produce greater extremism, society may, in many cases, be better off as a result.
But when group discussion tends to lead people to more strongly held versions of the same view with which they began, and if social influences and limited argument pools are responsible, there is legitimate reason for concern. Consider discussions among hate groups on the Internet and elsewhere. If the underlying views are unreasonable, it makes sense to fear that these discussions may fuel increasing hatred and a socially corrosive form of extremism. This does not mean that the discussions can or should be regulated in a system dedicated to freedom of speech. But it does raise questions about the idea that "more speech" is necessarily an adequate remedy - especially if people are increasingly able to wall themselves off from competing views.
The basic issue here is whether something like a "public sphere," with a wide range of voices, might not have significant advantages over a system in which isolated consumer choices produce a highly fragmented speech market. The most reasonable conclusion is that it is extremely important to ensure that people are exposed to views other than those with which they currently agree, in order to protect against the harmful effects of group polarization on individual thinking and on social cohesion. This does not mean that the government should jail or fine people who refuse to listen to others. Nor is what I have said inconsistent with approval of deliberating "enclaves," on the Internet or elsewhere, designed to ensure that positions that would otherwise be silenced or squelched have a chance to develop. Readers will be able to think of their own preferred illustrations; consider, perhaps, the views of people with disabilities. The great benefit of such enclaves is that positions may emerge that otherwise would not and that deserve to play a large role in the heterogeneous public. Properly understood, the case of "enclaves," or more simply discussion groups of like-minded people, is that they will improve social deliberation, democratic and otherwise. For these improvements to occur, members must not insulate themselves from competing positions, or at least any such attempts at insulation must not be a prolonged affair.
Consider in this light the ideal of "consumer sovereignty," which underlies much contemporary enthusiasm for the Internet. Consumer sovereignty means that people can choose to purchase, or to obtain, whatever they want. For many purposes this is a worthy ideal. But the adverse effects of group polarization show that with respect to communications, consumer sovereignty is likely to produce serious problems for individuals and society at large - and these problems will occur by a kind of iron logic of social interactions.
The phenomenon of group polarization is closely related to that of "social cascades." Cascade effects are common on the Internet, and we cannot understand the relationship between democracy and the Internet without having a sense of how cascades work.
It is obvious that many social groups, both large and small, seem to move both rapidly and dramatically in the direction of one or another set of beliefs or actions. These sorts of "cascades" often involve the spread of information; in fact they are driven by information. A key point here is that if you lack a great deal of private information, you may well rely on information provided by the statements or actions of others. A stylized example: If Joan is unaware whether abandoned toxic waste dumps are in fact hazardous, she may be moved in the direction of fear if Mary seems to think that fear is justified. If Joan and Mary both believe that fear is justified, Carl may end up thinking so too, at least if he lacks reliable independent information to the contrary. If Joan, Mary, and Carl believe that abandoned hazardous waste dumps are hazardous, Don will need to have a good deal of confidence to reject their shared conclusion.
The example shows how information travels, and often becomes quite entrenched, even if it is entirely wrong. The view, widespread in many African-American communities, that white doctors are responsible for the spread of AIDS among African-Americans is a recent illustration. Often cascades of this kind are quite local, and take different forms in different communities. Hence one group may end up believing something and another group the exact opposite, and the reason is the rapid transmission of one piece of information within one group and a different piece of information in the other. In a balkanized speech market, this danger takes a particular form: different groups may be led to quite different perspectives, as local cascades take people in radically different directions. The Internet dramatically increases the likelihood of rapid cascades, based on false information. Of course, low-cost Internet communication also makes it possible for truth, and corrections, to spread quickly as well. But sometimes this happens much too late. In that event, balkanization is extremely likely. As a result of the Internet, cascade effects are more common than they have ever been before.
As an especially troublesome example, consider pervasive doubts in South Africa, where about 20 percent of the adult population is infected by the AIDS virus, about the connection between HIV and AIDS. South African President Mbeki is a well-known Internet surfer, and he learned the views of the "denialists" after stumbling across one of their websites. The views of the "denialists" are not scientifically respectable - but to a nonspecialist, many of the claims on their (numerous) sites seem quite plausible. At least for a period, President Mbeki both fell victim to a cybercascade and through his public statements, helped to accelerate one, to the point where many South Africans at serious risk are now not convinced of the association between HIV and AIDS. It seems clear that this cascade effect has turned out to be literally deadly.
I hope that I have shown enough to demonstrate that for citizens of a heterogeneous democracy, a fragmented communications market creates considerable dangers. There are dangers for each of us as individuals; constant exposure to one set of views is likely to lead to errors and confusions, or to unthinking conformity (emphasized by John Stuart Mill). And to the extent that the process makes people less able to work cooperatively on shared problems, by turning collections of people into non-communicating confessional groups, there are dangers for society as a whole.
In a heterogeneous society, it is extremely important for diverse people to have a set of common experiences. Many of our practices reflect a judgment to this effect. National holidays, for example, help constitute a nation, by encouraging citizens to think, all at once, about events of shared importance. And they do much more than this. They enable people, in all their diversity, to have certain memories and attitudes. At least this is true in nations where national holidays have a vivid and concrete meaning. In the United States, many national holidays have become mere days-off-from-work, and the precipitating occasion - President's Day, Memorial Day, Labor Day - has come to be nearly invisible. This is a serious loss. With the possible exception of July 4th, Martin Luther King Day is probably the closest thing to a genuinely substantive national holiday, largely because that celebration involves something that can be treated as concrete and meaningful. In other words, it is about something.
Communications and the media are, of course, exceptionally important here. Sometimes millions of people follow the presidential election, or the Super Bowl, or the coronation of a new monarch; and many of them do so because of the simultaneous actions of others. The point very much bears on the historic role of both public forums and general interest intermediaries. Public parks are places where diverse people can congregate and see one another. General interest intermediaries, if they are operating properly, give a simultaneous sense of problems and tasks.
Why are these shared experiences so desirable? There are three principal reasons:
2. Sometimes shared experiences ease social interactions, permitting people to speak with one another, and to congregate around a common issue, task, or concern, whether or not they have much in common with one another. In this sense these experiences provide a form of social glue. They help make it possible for diverse people to believe that they live in the same culture. Indeed they help constitute that shared culture, simply by creating common memories and experiences, and a sense of common tasks.
3. A fortunate consequence of shared experiences - many of them produced by the media - is that people who would otherwise see one another as quite unfamiliar can come instead to regard one another as fellow citizens with shared hopes, goals, and concerns. This is a subjective good for those directly involved. But it can be an objective good as well, especially if it leads to cooperative projects of various kinds. When people learn about a disaster faced by fellow citizens, for example, they may respond with financial and other help. The point applies internationally as well as domestically; massive relief efforts are often made possible by virtue of the fact that millions of people learn, all at once, about the relevant need.
How does this bear on the Internet? The basic point is that an increasingly fragmented communications universe will reduce the level of shared experiences having salience to diverse people. This is a simple matter of numbers. When there were three television networks, much of what appeared would have the quality of a genuinely common experience. The lead story on the evening news, for example, would provide a common reference point for many millions of people. As choices proliferate, it is inevitable that diverse individuals, and diverse groups, will have fewer shared experiences and fewer common reference points. It is possible, for example, that some events that are highly salient to some people will barely register on others' viewscreens. And it is possible that some views and perspectives that seem obvious for many people will, for others, seem barely intelligible.
This is hardly a suggestion that everyone should be required to watch the same thing. A degree of plurality, with respect to both topics and points of view, is highly desirable. Moreover, talk about "requirements" misses the point. My only claim is that a common set of frameworks and experiences is valuable for a heterogeneous society, and that a system with limitless options, making for diverse choices, will compromise the underlying values.
My goal here has been to understand what makes for a well-functioning system of free expression, and to show how consumer sovereignty, in a world of endless choices, is likely to undermine that system. The essential point is that a well-functioning system includes a kind of public sphere, one that fosters common experiences, in which people hear messages that challenge their prior convictions, and in which citizens can present their views to a broad audience. I do not intend to offer a comprehensive set of policy reforms or any kind of blueprint for the future. In fact, this may be a domain in which a problem exists for which there is no useful cure. The genie might simply be out of the bottle. But it will be useful to offer a few ideas, if only by way of introduction to questions that are likely to engage public attention in the first decades of the twenty-first century.
In thinking about reforms, it is important to have a sense of the problems we aim to address, and some possible ways of addressing them. If the discussion thus far is correct, there are three fundamental concerns from the democratic point of view. These are:
(b) the value of a range of common experiences;
(c) the need for exposure to substantive questions of policy and principle, combined with a range of positions on such questions.
Of course it would be ideal if citizens were demanding, and private information providers were creating, a range of initiatives designed to alleviate the underlying concerns. Perhaps they will; there is some evidence to this effect. In fact, new technology creates growing opportunities for exposure to diverse points of view, and growing opportunities for shared experiences. Private choices may create far more in the way of exposure to new topics and points of view, and a larger range of shared experiences. But to the extent that they fail to do so, it is worthwhile considering both private and public initiatives designed to pick up the slack.
Drawing on recent developments in regulation generally, we can see the potential appeal of five simple alternatives. Of course different proposals would work better for some communications outlets than others. I will speak here of both private and public responses, but the former should be favored: They are less intrusive, and in general they are likely to be more effective as well.
Disclosure: Producers of communications might disclose important information on their own, about the degree to which they are promoting democratic goals. To the extent that they do not, they might be subject, not to regulation, but to disclosure requirements. In the environmental area, this strategy has produced excellent results. The mere fact that polluters have been asked to disclose toxic releases has produced voluntary, low-cost reductions. Apparently fearful of public opprobrium, companies have been spurred to reduce toxic emissions on their own. The same strategy has been used in the context of both movies and television, with ratings systems designed partly to increase parental control over what children see. On the Internet, many sites disclose their inappropriateness for children.
The same idea could be used far more broadly. Television broadcasters might, for example, be asked to disclose their public interest activities. On a quarterly basis, they might say whether and to what extent they have provided educational programming for children, free air time for candidates, and closed captioning for the hearing impaired. They might also be asked whether they have covered issues of concern to the local community and allowed opposing views a chance to speak. The Federal Communications Commission has already taken steps in this direction; it could do a lot more. Of course disclosure is unlikely to be a full solution to the problems that I have discussed here. But modest steps in this direction are likely to do little harm and at least some good.
Self Regulation: Producers of communications might engage in voluntary self-regulation. Some of the difficulties in the current speech market stem from relentless competition for viewers and listeners, competition that leads to a situation that many journalists abhor, and from which society does not benefit. The competition might be reduced via a "code" of appropriate conduct, agreed upon by various companies, and encouraged but not imposed by government. In fact the National Association of Broadcasters maintained such a code for several decades, and there is growing interest in voluntary self-regulation for both television and the Internet. The case for this approach is that it avoids government regulation while at the same time reducing some of the harmful effects of market pressures. Any such code could, for example, call for opposing views to be heard, or for the avoidance of unnecessary sensationalism, or for arguments to be offered whenever feasible, rather than quick "sound-bites." On television, as distinct from the Internet, the idea seems quite viable. But perhaps Internet sites could also enter into informal, voluntary arrangements, agreeing to create links, an idea to which I will shortly turn.
Subsidy: The government might subsidize speech, as, for example, through publicly subsidized programming or publicly subsidized websites. This is of course the idea that motivates the notion of a Public Broadcasting System. But it is reasonable to ask whether the PBS model is not outmoded in the current communications environment. Other approaches, similarly designed to promote educational, cultural, and democratic goals, might well be ventured. Perhaps government could subsidize a "Public.Net" intended to encourage debate on public issues among diverse citizens - and to create a right of access to speakers of various sorts.
Links: Websites might use links so as to ensure that viewers learn about sites containing opposing views. A liberal magazine's website might, for example, provide a link to a conservative magazine's website, and the conservative magazine might do the same in reverse. The idea would be to decrease the likelihood that people will simply hear echoes of their own voices. Of course many people would not click on the icons of sites whose views seemed objectionable; but some people would, and in that sense the system would not operate so differently from general interest intermediaries and public forums. Here too the ideal situation would be voluntary action. But if this proves impossible, it is worth considering both subsidies and regulatory alternatives.
Public Sidewalk: If the problem consists in the failure to attend to public issues, the most popular websites in any given period might offer links designed to ensure more exposure to substantive questions. Under such a system, viewers of especially popular sites would see an icon for sites that deal with substantive issues in a serious way. It is well-established that whenever there is a link to a particular place from a major site, such as MSNBC, the traffic is huge. Nothing here imposes any requirements on viewers. People would not be required to click on links. But it is reasonable to expect that many viewers would do so, if only to satisfy their curiosity. The result would be to create a kind of Internet "sidewalk," promoting some of the purposes of the public forum doctrine. Ideally, those who create websites might move in this direction on their own. To those who believe that this step would do no good, it is worth recalling that advertisers are willing to spend a great deal of money to obtain brief access to people's eyeballs. This strategy might be used to create something like a public sphere as well.
These are brief thoughts on some complex subjects. My goal has not been to evaluate any proposal in detail, but to give a flavor of some possibilities for those concerned to promote democratic goals in a dramatically changed environment. The basic question is whether it might be possible to create spaces that have some of the functions of public forums, and general interest intermediaries, in the age of the Internet. It seems clear that government's power to regulate effectively is diminished as the number of options expands. I am not sure that any response would be worthwhile, all things considered. But I am sure that if new technologies diminish the number of common spaces, and reduce, for many, the number of unanticipated, unchosen exposures, something important will have been lost. The most essential point is to have a sense of what a well-functioning democratic order requires.
My principal claim here has been that a well-functioning democracy depends on far more than restraints on official censorship of controversial ideas and opinions. It also depends on some kind of public sphere, in which a wide range of speakers have access to a diverse public - and also to particular institutions, and practices, against which they seek to launch objections.
Emerging technologies, including the Internet, are hardly an enemy here. They hold out at least as much promise as risk, especially because they allow people to widen their horizons. But to the extent that they weaken the power of general interest intermediaries, and increase people's ability to wall themselves off from topics and opinions that they would prefer to avoid, they create serious dangers. And if we believe that a system of free expression calls for unrestricted choices by individual consumers, we will not even understand the dangers as such. Whether such dangers will materialize will ultimately depend on the aspirations, for freedom and democracy alike, by whose light we evaluate our practices. What I have sought to establish here is that in a free republic, citizens aspire to a system that provides a wide range of experiences - with people, topics, and ideas - that would not have been selected in advance.
 A.C. This article borrows from C.R. Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton University Press, 2001). The excerpts used here are reprinted by permission.
 A.C. Sikes (ed.), Fast Forward. New York: William Morrow, 2000: 204, 211.
 Id. at 25.
 Hague v. CIO, 307 US 496 (1939).
 I draw here on the excellent treatment in N.D. Zatz, "Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Environment," Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, vol.12, 1998: 149.
 For citations and general discussion, see C.R. Sunstein, "Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes," Yale Law Journal, vol.110, no.1, October 2000.
 See id. for details.
 See M. Zook, "The Unorganized Militia Network: Conspiracies, Computers, and Community," Berkeley Planning Journal, vol.11, 1996, available at: https://socrates.berkeley.edu/~zook/pubs/Militia_paper.html.
 See for example S. Biikhchandani et al., "Learning from the Behavior of Others," Journal of Economic Perspectives, summer 1998: 151.
 I draw here on C.R. Sunstein and E. Ullmann-Margalit, "Solidarity Goods," Journal of Political Philosophy, vol.9, issue 2, 2001.
 See A. Shapiro, The Control Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
 See A. Chin, "Making the World Wide Web Safe for Democracy," Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, vol.19, no.2, winter 1997: 309.
 See C.R. Sunstein, Republic.com, for more detail.